Abstract: This paper examines several questions regarding fiscal sustainability and adjustment in Brazil from 1991 to 2000. We find that during most of this period, the operational deficit was stationarity, and hence the debt was not growing boundlessly. However, before the Real plan (July 1994), the regime appears to be 'fiscal dominant' (FD) or non-Ricardian rather than 'monetary dominant' (MD), since the primary surplus did not respond to changes in real government debt. As expected under an FD regime, inflation was an important source of finance with monetary policy subordinated and constrained by fiscal financing requirements. However, the contemporaneous price level did not increase, that is real debt did fall not in anticipation of future primary deficits-contrary to an implication of the recently developed fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). Then, in the first months of the Real plan, evidence points to a sustainable MD regime, helped by surging tax revenues. As real interest rates fell from 1995 to 1997, the government spent and borrowed more. As a result, the deficit became unsustainable. The recent fiscal adjustments (1999)(2000) helped the deficit become sustainable once again, but evidence does point to a MD regime. This finding does not necessarily preclude an independent monetary policy and the credibility of the inflation targeting regime. However, markets must believe that future adjustments to the primary surplus, when required, will in fact occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
All governments face an intertemporal budget constraint: the current real value of its net liabilities must by definition equal the present discounted value of future primary surpluses (tax revenues minus non-interest expenditures). If this constraint can be satisfied without a change in either policy or the price level, current fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. If the government adjusts the primary deficit to limit debt accumulation, the central bank is not forced to inflate away the debt. Such a regime has been called monetary dominant (MD) or Ricardian. By contrast, under a fiscal dominant (FD) or non-Ricardian (FD) regime, primary deficits are set independently of real liabilities. 1 Brazil provides a good example of such concepts. Faced with high deficits, inflation, and dramatic policy shifts, Brazil's government met its intertemporal budget constraint in different ways during the post-war period. Adjustments to the primary surplus helped limit the real value of Brazilian debt between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Then, as revenue collection became more testing and nominal expenditure difficult to compress, real government debt was instead reduced by inflation and incomplete indexation.
2 With the Real Plan of 1994, inflation fell dramatically, reducing the primary deficit (through higher tax collections) while initially rising real interest payments. From 1995 onwards, both the primary deficit and real interest payments rose, causing a buildup of real public debt (see Chart 1). These events helped cause the collapse of Brazil's fixed-crawl exchange rate regime in early 1999. In response, taxes were raised, expenditures cut, and the primary surplus increased. By mid-2000 key fiscal targets were met under a 3-year (1999) (2000) (2001) International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored program. This paper examines three questions related to intertemporal solvency and fiscal adjustment in Brazil between 1991-2000, using monthly fiscal data. First, has recent fiscal policy in Brazil been sustainable? In light of policy shifts, has the deficit appeared to be sustainable during some periods but not others? Empirically, sustainable fiscal policy means that the real operational deficit (ODEF) fluctuates about some mean rather than drifting (1998)). Unfortunately, it is difficult to directly test the FTPL. However, several authors, including Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998, hereafter referred to as CCD) note that, a necessary condition for the FTPL to hold is that the regime must be FD.
As mentioned earlier, this paper attempts to empirically distinguish between FD and MD regimes. However, the empirical framework mentioned above is also well-suited to examine some hypotheses related to the FTPL. For example, according to the FTPL, when private agents anticipate a gap between current government debt and the present value of future primary surpluses in an FD regime, their attempts to trade bonds for goods should increase price level and reduce the real value of government obligations today.
Empirically most of the literature about the FTPL has focused on the U.S., not developing countries. But most evidence suggests that the U.S. is MD rather than FD. By contrast, Brazil is a country that witnessed high deficits, inflation, and dramatic policy shifts. As such, it will more likely have a FD regime and thus should provide an excellent alternative laboratory to examine such issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of fiscal developments in Brazil during the 1990s. Section III reviews some basic identities and tests related to intertemporal solvency and fiscal sustainability and presents results of stationarity tests for Brazil's real operational deficit, using monthly data for the consolidated public sector, from 1991 to early 2000. Section IV presents estimates of the relationship between the consolidated primary deficicit and real interest payments. Section V extends the analysis by separating certain revenues and expenditures. Section VI presents a summary and some conclusions.
Several conclusions emerge. Regarding the sustainability of fiscal policy, results for both the entire period from January 1991 to February 2000 and several subperiods indicate that the deficit is stationary and hence fiscal policy is sustainable. Somewhat differently, estimates from rolling two-year samples suggest that, between (approximately) late 1995 and early 1999 (when the Real was allowed to freely float), the null hypothesis of non-stationarity was not rejected and therefore the deficit was growing boundlessly. Afterwards, the deficit again appears to be stationary.
Regarding the adjustment between PDEF and RIP, both backward-and forwardlooking tests reveal some temporal relationships between these variables during certain periods (primarily the post-Real plan) but little relationship for the 1991-2000 period as a whole. Backward looking tests reveal that, for several months after the Real plan, ∆PDEF decreased in response to ∆RIP, helping to restrain the debt. This finding may however reflect the surge in tax revenues that occurred in the early months of the Real plan.
During this same period, according to forward-looking tests, innovations to ∆PDEF were negatively associated with future values of ∆RIP. Indeed, between 1995 and 1997, both the primary surplus and the implicit real interest rates on domestic debt fell. As mentioned above, this finding might reflect a rational intertemporal choice by the government to borrow more today under the expectation of lower future interest rates. More likely, it might reflect an implicit choice by the government: lower real interest rates allowed the government to delay fiscal and structural reforms and provided more room for borrowing than otherwise. Also, such a strategy may also be unduly risky, especially if not followed symmetrically.
A related analysis breaks down PDF into three components, namely discretionary federal government expenditure G D , federal taxes T F and other elements of the primary deficit PDO. This analysis presents a more complete picture. Only after the real-Plan, current innovations in T F are negatively related to future real interest payments. This result thus suggests that the Real plan represented a break in fiscal regime, since the authorities attempted to limit indebtedness by raising taxes only after the Real plan. However, the analysis reveals no relationship between current innovations to G D and future RIP. And, current innovations to PDO are negatively related to future RIP, perhaps reflecting the intertemporal strategy mentioned above.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAZIL DURING THE 1990S.
This section provides a prelude to the econometric analysis. First, section II.a presents several issues regarding the measurement of Brazil's public deficit. In section II.b., fiscal impacts of the Real Plan of July 1994 are discussed. In section II.c, the fiscal implications of external pressures in 1997 and 1998 are examined. Section II.d analyses the fiscal adjustment under the IMF plan of 1998. Finally, section II.d presents a discussion of the Real crisis of early 1999 and further adjustment under the IMF program.
A. Some Measurement Issues
Brazil's consolidated public sector includes the central government (the federal government, central bank, and social security system for private sector workers; INSS), state and municipal governments, and public enterprises at all 3 levels of government.
7 Net public liabilities, presented in Table 1 , include debt (B) and the monetary base (M).
8 From 1996
7 As mentioned above, this paper examines fiscal data of the consolidated public sector in Brazil between 1991 and 1999 . Other papers, including Tanner (1994 ,1995 , Rocha (1997) , and Rossi (1997) examine the gross internal debt of the Brazilian federal government. While such data cover a longer period, they are not comparable with the data examined here, which are available only from 1991 onward.
8 In Brazil, while most debt is exchanged in the market (securitized), some debt is not marketable (contractual).
onward, official government debt figures reflect two important factors. First, the direct positive impact of the proceeds obtained from the privatization of public assets (used mainly to reduce debt), and the indirect effect of the transfer of the liabilities of some of the privatized enterprises to private hands. Second, the debt increasing effects of certain past arrears and other previously unsecuritized debts that were explicitly recognized-other discrete adjustments, such as the recapitalization to federal banks also impacted negatively public debt levels. Thus, an unadjusted end-period measure of liabilities in current Reais (B t + M t ) equals the previous period's liabilities plus the (flow) current deficit (the primary deficit plus interest payments) minus debt operations associated with privatization (PRIV t ) plus, explicit recognition of arrears and other discrete adjustments to the debt stock (ARR t ), henceforth called simply arrears, while an adjusted measure of liabilities exclude these latter effects.
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Data are also presented in constant (deflated) Reais (B t +M t )/P t = LIAB t and as a percent of GDP ((B t + M t )/GDP t ) ).
10 Both Table 1 and Chart 1 show that total net public sector debt falls between 1991 and 1994, but rises thereafter, both in constant Reais and as a percent of GDP. During this period federal debt as a percent of the total continually rises. Table 2 presents yearly deficit flows in constant Reais, constructed from these (real) stock data, both with and without the effects of net privatization proceeds. Part A presents the operational deficit (ODEF = LIAB t -LIAB t-1 ). This flow includes the effects of privatization revenues PRIV t and arrears recognition ARR t . The operational deficit equals the sum of the real primary deficit PDEF t (also including PRIV t and ARR t ). Part B shows the primary deficit (PDEF t = G t -T t + PRIV t + ARR t ). Part C presents real interest payments (RIP t = ODEF t -PDEF t ). Part D shows adjustments for privatization (PRIV t ) and recognition of arrears (ARR t ).
11 Monthly counterparts of these data are shown in Chart 2. Table 3 presents these   9 Unless otherwise noted, all econometric analysis in this paper uses the adjusted measure. If such an adjustment for privatization is not made, the net asset position of the government debt may be understated since the reduction in gross assets is not recorded. Similarly, to include explicitly recognized arrears may introduce a bias since those obligations had previously existed. 10 The deflator is the centered general price index (IGP-DI centrado), base June 1995 = 100. The deflator is adjusted to reflect prices at end-of-month. GDP data use end-year (December) prices. To calculate annual flows as a percent of GDP, real monthly flows from January to December are summed; this sum is then multiplied by the December price level and then divided by the above GDP figure based on December prices. This procedure may yield annual flows in percent of GDP different from other published figures.
11 For example, in 1998, the expanded operational operational deficit ODEF t , 2.2 percent of GDP, reflects reductions of public sector debt due both to privatization (PRIV t = -1.9 percent of GDP) and arrears recognition (-.1 percent of GDP). Accordingly, the adjusted (or restricted) operational deficit is ODEF(adjusted) t approaches 4 percent of GDP.
balances in percent of GDP and the implicit real interest rate (real interest payments divided by debt) in annual percentage terms.
B. Impact of the Real Plan (July 1994)
For Brazil, the Real Plan of July 1994 represented dramatic changes. Prior to the Real Plan stagflation prevailed; annual inflation exceeded 2,500 percent while real GDP growth was low. With the inception of the Real Plan, inflation fell to single digits and growth rebounded. Reforms begun previously under Presidents Collor de Mello and Franco, including trade liberalization and limitations on bank credit to the public sector. After the Real plan, both the current and capital accounts were further liberalized, inward foreign investment was promoted, the privatization program accelerated and extended to new sectors, several key areas in the private sector were deregulated, and the financial system (especially state-owned banks) was strengthened.
The Real plan had important implications for Brazil's fiscal position. Prior to the Real plan, relatively good tax indexation and the debasement of many expenditure items raised the primary surplus to about 2 ½ percent of GDP, while inflation helped reduce ex-post real interest payments and hence real government debt. The Real Plan immediately slashed inflation and boosted output. In 1994, tax collections grew dramatically, further increasing the primary surplus to almost 5 percent of GDP.
12 However, expenditures soon began to grow. Real interest payments rose, as lower inflation meant led to higher ex-post (implicit) real interest rates, but this hike was temporary. Moreover, in early 1995, in the wake of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, the central bank further raised interest rates to shore up the Real against external pressures. Subsequently, real interest rates fell from about 20 percent in 1995 to under 11 percent in 1997 (Table 3 , Part D, memorandum).
Between 1994 and 1996, real interest payments (RIP) averaged 5.3 percent of GDP (Table 3) . Pressures mounted on non-interest expenditures as well, discretionary and entitlements alike (the latter including social security and transfers to states and municipalities.) 13 Also in 1996, early privatizations reduced public sector debt about 0.1 percent of GDP, while recognition of "arrears" and other discrete debt adjustments (including the recapitalization of Banco do Brasil) raised public debt by about 1.9 percent of GDP.
C. External Pressures, Growing Deficits, and Adjustment, 1997 -98
Events in Asia that began in mid-1997 affected Brazil. Earlier that year, real interest rates were falling, and RIP had declined to 1 percent of GDP. Privatization proceeds for 1997 totaled about 1.9 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, pressures on non-interest expenditures continued, boosting the primary deficit. Both fiscal and external deficits made Brazil vulnerable to foreign shocks. At end-October 1997, as the Asian crisis worsened, contagion threatened the stability of the Real. To calm markets, the central bank doubled the overnight reference (SELIC) rate and announced a comprehensive fiscal adjustment package involving tax increases and spending cuts. The net yield of the package for 1998 (so-called Pacote 51, since it entailed 51 measures) was estimated at around 2½ percent of GDP (R$20.6 billion). Concurrently, the government intensified discussions about social security and administrative reforms. As a result, stock prices rallied, US dollar interest spreads fell and international reserves recovered somewhat. Domestic interest rates gradually fell to pre-crisis levels by the third quarter of the year. However, the fiscal measures were less successful. Some of the planned spending cuts were not made. Instead, the fiscal stance loosened further in early 1998. For the first 3 quarters of 1998, real federal primary spending was 12 ½ percent above that of the same period of 1997. Privatization proceeds for 1998 totaled around 1.4 percent of GDP, but arrears recognition boosted public obligations by about 2 percent of GDP to public debt. Also, the deficit of the private sector workers' social security system (INSS) more than doubled from the previous year, to around R$7.3 billion (0.8% of GDP), due to increased minimum benefits and delays in previously planned reforms 14 .
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D. Fiscal Adjustment Under the IMF Package, 1998
As 1998 progressed, Brazil remained vulnerable to contagion. Following the Russian moratorium of August 1998, as during the Asian crisis, the authorities raised domestic interest rates. By itself, tight money could not defend the Real. In October 1998, the government announced a 'mini-package' approaching percent of GDP during the last quarter of 1998. Federal non-interest expenditures were cut by 10 percent, other appropriation limits were imposed, spending by public enterprises was cut by R$1 billion, and bank and foreign financing for states and municipalities was cut.
Next, a medium-term program was announced, supported by a US$42 billion funding package with international organizations, including US$18 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 15 The program aimed to slow debt accumulation over the medium term, with the debt-to-GDP ratio falling through 2001. 16 The primary surplus was programmed to rise to 2.6 percent of GDP in 1999 including 1.3 percent from the central government, then to 2.8 and 3.0 in 2000 and 2001. To do so, tax measures of roughly 2 percent of GDP in both 1999 and 2000 were implemented. These included rate increases on the financial transactions (CPMF) and social security contributions (COFINS) taxes and base broadening of the value added (IPI) and income (renda) taxes. 17 Spending measures included, among other things, nominal caps on public sector wages.
18
14 Benefit claims in the social security system surged as recipients anticipated a future reform. 15 The remainder came from other multilateral organizations, including the World and Interamerican Development Banks, Japan, and several BIS member countries. Ultimately, Brazil did not entirely use these funds. 16 For further details, see the Letter of Intent (LOI, 13 November 1998) and the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU, 8 December 1998), on the IMF website (www.imf.org).
In this context, the crawling-peg exchange rate regime (with a slowly widening band) was to be maintained, monetary policy was to remain tight, and further broad structural reforms, including privatization, were to continue. Also, the government began at this time to try to shift the maturity composition of government debt and to extend average maturities. To reduce rollover risk, the government lengthened the maturity of its debt.
19 However, the market demanded floating-rate instruments rather then fixed-rate (as before), seeking protection from unanticipated market fluctuations, namely further interest rate hikes.
E. The Real Crisis and Further Fiscal Adjustment, 1999
In early 1999, the program faced several challenges. First, there was legislative and judicial resistance to both revenue and expenditure measures. Critically, an increase in the CPMF was delayed. Second, high interest rates and tight money, required to support the Real, were opposed by the industrial sector. Third, in January, Minas Gerais state governor and expresident Itamar Franco threatened to default on the state's obligations. As a result, the currency peg was abandoned on January 15 and the Real / Dollar exchange rate rose immediately from 1.52 to 1.91, reaching over 2.0 the following by the end of the month. The exchange rate overshooting peak took place during the first days of March.
The Real's rapid depreciation had important fiscal implications. About 40 percent of public sector debt was linked to the US dollar (including about 20 percent in foreign debt). Accordingly, the debt-to-GDP ratio rose about 11 percentage points, to over 53 percent of GDP. In response, the targeted primary surpluses were increased to 3.1 percent in 1999, 3. This additional primary adjustment was obtained through both revenue (including efforts to collect back taxes) and spending measures. The crawling-peg exchange rate regime was replaced with a managed float. To provide a nominal anchor, an inflation targeting program was introduced.
20 By year's end, the macroeconomic adjustment effort undertaken in 1999 was overwhelmingly regarded as successful, despite the slower-than-expected turnaround of the trade balance. Fiscal targets were met and, despite the sizeable depreciation of the currency, inflation remained below 9 percent at year's end, and real GDP grew, beating the most optimistic expectations, actually grew by 1.1 percent.
III. THE SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY IN BRAZIL
In recent years, a sizeable literature devoted to assessing the sustainability of a country's fiscal policy has emerged. Several techniques from this literature are applied to Brazil. In Section III.a, some preliminary identities and tests are presented. Section III.b presents empirical results.
A. Preliminary Identities and Tests
In any period, the government's budget constraint is:
where G t and T t are real government expenditures and revenues, i t is the nominal interest rate, P t is the price level, B t is interest bearing debt held by public, and M t is the monetary base (government debt held by the central bank). Shifting subscripts, equation (1) can also be written:
where S t+1 = i t+1 M t /P t+1 is the foregone interest payments on the public's money holdings that accrue to the government (a measure of seignorage) and r is the real interest rate (r = (1+ i)P t-1 /P t ). 21 Substituting equation (1'') forward from the current period (period 1) to infinity ((1''), (using the identities LIAB t = (M t + B t )/P t and PDEF t = [G t -T t -S t ]) yields the intertemporal budget constraint:
Here, seignorage is measured more traditionally as (M t+1 -M t )/P t+1 . However, the two measures of seignorage are equal when the growth rate of real money demand equals the real interest rate r.
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The transversality condition is:
Equations (2) and (3) summarize the notion of governmental intertemporal budget balance (GIBB). These expressions hold by definition and hence as identities are not testable. However, it is possible to test whether the observed behavior of G, T, M, B, and P over time are sustainable (and hence consistent with GIBB). By contrast, if fiscal policy is not sustainable, an adjustment to one or more fiscal variables will be required at some future date.
Several tests of fiscal sustainability have been developed in the literature, including Hamilton and Flavin (1986) , Wilcox (1991) , Trehan and Walsh (1991) , Bohn (1991) , Hakkio and Rush (1991) , and others. Trehan and Walsh (1991) test whether real operational deficit ODEF t = LIAB t -LIAB t-1 is stationary about a constant. Their test is the empirical counterpart to McCallum's (1984) demonstration that, over an infinite horizon, constant interest inclusive deficit is consistent with GIBB.
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Trehan and Walsh's test is similar to that of Hakkio and Rush (1991) Bohn (1991) , for the cointegration of G, T * , LIAB with a vector of coefficients [1, -1, r] requires a constant real interest rate.
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity implies that a 1 = 0. The related Zt and Zα tests, due to Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) are also presented.
B. Empirical Results.
In this section, tests for the stationarity of ODEF are presented. During the period under study, there have been dramatic changes in policy, and parameters may vary over time. Accordingly, estimates are presented for both the entire 1991:1 -2000:2 period and selected sub-samples, namely the pre-Real period (1991:1 -1994:6) , the post-Real period (1994:7 -1999:4) , and the post-Tequila period (1995:4 -1999:3) . However, since these subperiods are to some degree arbitrary, estimates for rolling two year periods, beginning with the period 1991:1 -1993:1 and ending with the period 1998:2 -2000:2, are also presented. Table 4 presents the stationarity tests mentioned above: ADF, Zt and Zα. For the entire sample, as well as all three sub-periods, most results suggest that ODEF is stationary: with the exception of the ADF statistics for the pre-Real period, for all three statistics and all periods, the null hypothesis of the non-stationarity of ODEF is rejected at the 90 percent level or better.
However, ADF statistics from rolling 2-year samples (Chart 3) reveal a somewhat different story. The finding of stationarity for the pre-Real period is weakened somewhat: for several periods, from the beginning of the sample through 1992:8 -1994:8, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Then, for most of 1994 through 1996, ADF statistics indicate rejection of the null of non-stationarity at the 95 percent level. Importantly, for 24-months rolling windows staring in early 1995 through early 1997 (that is, ending in early 1999), the ADF statistic is (absolutely) less than 2.75, once again suggesting a nonstationary process for the operational deficit. Finally, rolling windows starting from 1997:3 onward, we observe something akin to a regime shift, since the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected at the 90 percent level or better.
IV. THE ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM: FISCAL VERSUS MONETARY DOMINANCE
Closely related to fiscal sustainability is the issue of adjustment: what mechanism limits government indebtedness according to equations (2) and (3)? Potentially, the primary deficit (PDEF = G -T * ), through changes in G, T * , or both, may respond to changes in the real value of liabilities, thus balancing the government's intertemporal budget, according to equations (2) and (3). In this case, monetary policy is not determined by fiscal considerations. For this reason, such a regime has been called 'monetary dominant (MD)' (see Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1998) ). Alternatively, if there is no such response, the primary deficit is set independently of either liabilities or real interest payments. In this case, monetary policy is determined by fiscal needs, under a 'fiscal dominant' (FD) regime. And, an MD regime is required for monetary policy to be conducted independently. 24 A related notion that has also recently received attention is the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) (see Woodford (1995 Woodford ( , 1996 , Cochrane (1998), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1998) ): continual adjustments in the price level, rather than the primary deficit, force equation (3) (intertemporal balance) to hold at any point in time (since real liabilities LIAB t equal nominal liabilities deflated by the price level (M t +B t )/P t ). 25 The FTPL cannot hold under an MD regime. Rather, for the FTPL to hold, an FD regime is necessary (but not sufficient).
Conceptually, these notions are familiar to most macroeconomists. However, as discussed below, it is difficult to distinguish between these regimes and even harder to test for the FTPL. This section represents an attempt to examine the adjustment mechanism in Brazil. To begin, section IV.a develops a definition of a MD regime as one in which the primary deficit consistently responds to real interest payments to limit the present value of the debt. Then, two empirical tests are presented. First, in section IV.b, a one-equation test, similar to work by Bohn (1996) , is presented. Looking backward, does the government cut its primary deficit when real interest payments rise? If so, there should be a short-run negative relationship between PDEF and RIP. While there are severe shortcomings to this test (also discussed), its appeal lies in its simplicity, and it is thus presented as a 'first pass'. Then, in section IV.c, to remedy these shortcomings, a more complex framework is presented. This test, similar to one developed by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1998) , uses a vector autoregression system (VAR) whose elements include the primary deficit and government debt. The framework permits a forward-looking examination of fiscal policy that can test for a broad range of fiscal adjustment patterns. Do current reductions in the primary deficit help pay down the debt? Do current borrowing decisions reflect future interest payments? Or, is today's primary deficit independent of future indebtedness?
A. Distinguishing between MD and FD regimes: Some issues
To empirically distinguish between two MD and FD regimes, it is first necessary to define an MD regime. For the tests in this paper, under a MD regime, the government adjusts 24 A good example is the recently implemented inflation targeting regime in Brazil. 25 Such a price level adjustment need not be the result of current monetization. Rather, as Woodford (1995) notes, the price level can adjust through a wealth effect: private agents sell their (excess) government assets in return for goods, and goods prices hence rise.
the primary surplus on a regular basis to limit the level of real indebtedness according to (2). Equivalently, to satisfy (2) under a MD regime, movements in PDEF should be proportional to those of RIP. For example, assuming for simplicity a constant interest rate r, the constant primary deficit required to satisfy (2) is PDEF * = -r/(1+r) LIAB 0. = -RIP/(1+r). More generally, if the primary deficit follows a stationary autoregressive process PDEF t = λ 0 + λ 1 PDEF t-1 + v t, , with λ 1 < 1, where v t contains both an error term and one-time adjustments, the expected present value of current and future primary deficits is:
Accordingly, under an MD regime, the primary surplus that satisfies (2) PDEF * t equals a factor proportional to real interest payments plus a constant term:
Note that if λ 1 (1+r) < 1, the rightmost term converges to λ 0 (1+r)/[1-λ 1 (1+r)]. Thus (7) is a reaction function: it captures systematic responses of the current primary deficit to either primary deficits, change in interest rates (including changes in the exchange rate for dollar denominated debt), or both.
It may be more fruitful to analyze fiscal adjustment in a forward-looking manner. To illustrate, consider several examples. First, under a MD regime (as defined above) current reductions in PDEF help pay down the debt and hence reduce RIP in the future. If so, we should observe a positive relationship between current innovations to PDEF today and future RIP.
Second, under a FD regime (as defined above) when private agents perceive a gap between the value of government debt today and the present value of primary surpluses in the future, they attempt to sell bonds. This raises the price level and thus reduces the real value of government debt today. According to the FTPL, we would observe a negative relationship between current innovations to RIP and future PDEF. Such an interpretation is plausible if inflation is high. However, as an alternative interpretation, such a relationship may simply reflect backward-looking adjustments of PDEF to RIP like those discussed above. Such an interpretation is more plausible if inflation is low. Note also that the FTPL interpretation ignores the possibility of a risk premium: when private agents perceive a gap between the value of government debt today and the present value of primary surpluses in the future, they may require higher interest rates to hold government debt.
Third, policy makers may incorporate future real interest rates when deciding today's current primary deficit. For example, they may spend more and borrow more if they anticipate lower interest rates in the future. If so, there should be a negative relationship between current innovations to PDEF today and RIP in the future.
B. Single-equation test: The response of ∆ ∆PDEF to ∆ ∆RIP
Even if (2) holds through adjustments in PDEF, it may be unrealistic to expect that the PDEF and RIP/(1+r) move (minus) one-to-one over the short run. Instead, consider the testable reaction function:
This is a backward looking test since today's real interest payments apply to yesterday's outstanding debt stock. Also, since equation (8) is specified in first differences, b 1 reflects a short-term relationship between PDEF and RIP, not a cointegrating relationship.
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Unfortunately, while equation (8) can in some cases rule out a MD regime, it cannot distinguish between MD and FD regimes. For example, under a MD regime, the primary deficit responds to changes in real interest payments. By contrast, under a FD regime, if the FTPL also holds, the price level jumps and real interest payments fall in anticipation of future primary deficits. In either case, b 1 would be negative. However, even if price level doesn't jump in anticipation of future primary deficits, b 1 will be zero or positive under a FD regime. Therefore, if b 1 is either not different from zero or significantly positive, a MD regime is ruled out. Table 5 presents estimates of equation (8) for both the entire 1991:1 -2000:2 period and the same subsamples presented above. In all cases, there appears to be no statistically significant reaction of ∆PDEF to ∆RIP. Instead, the null hypothesis of b 1 = 0 is never rejected. These results do not favor a MD regime: for neither the entire period nor the subperiods was debt limited by regular adjustments to the primary deficit.
Estimates of b 1 from rolling two-year samples (see Chart 4) modify the story somewhat. For most of the sample period, b 1 is not significantly from zero. However, from 1995 However, from :4 -1997 However, from :4 to 1995 However, from :11 -1997 period that includes the start of the Real Plan (July 1994), b 1 is negative and statistically different from zero. Thus, an MD regime cannot be ruled out during this period. However, for subsequent periods, estimates of b 1 are not different from zero, once again ruling out an MD regime. Note also that, during this most recent period, the deficit is stationary. As noted in Section II, there were fiscal adjustments during the later part of this period. However, these adjustments may have not been statistically perceived as sufficiently permanent (possibly due to lack of enough observations) and hence not statistically related to real interest payments.
C. Vector Autoregression Analysis
Equation (8) is simple and intuitive. However, a one-equation framework may be insufficient to address questions like those posed here. As discussed above, such a framework cannot distinguish between ex-post adjustments of PDEF to RIP (consistent with an MD regime) and ex-ante adjustments of RIP to PDEF (consistent with an FD regime and the FTPL). Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1998, hereafter referred to as CCD) propose a vector autoregression (VAR) framework that permits a richer analysis of fiscal adjustment, including several of the issues discussed above. A modification of CCD's VAR is:
where X = [RIP, PDEF] is the real value of outstanding liabilities, a i is a vector of coefficients, and v t = (v PDEF , v RIP ) is a vector of error terms. 28 In standard fashion, assume that each element of the error vector v t is in turn composed of "own" error terms w t = (w PDEFt , w RIPt ) and contemporaneous correlations with "other" errors:
If X is a cointegrating vector, an error-correction term θ θ k X t-k should also be included. In the analysis, it is assumed that RIP and PDEF move together one-to-one (i.e. that ODEF is stationary). Thus, the error correction term is ODEF. However, results were largely insensitive to the inclusion or omission of such a term.
where B is a 3 x 3 matrix whose diagonal elements ("own correlations") equal one and whose nonzero off-diagonal elements reflect contemporaneous correlations among the error terms. Also, (10) yields impulse response functions (IRF's) that summarize the effects of current innovations w t on values of X.
Like any VAR framework, system (9) estimates relationships of time-series causality or 'precedence' between variables (see Maddala (1992, p. 357) ) that run in both directions. These time-series relationships have economic interpretations that depend on the direction and the sign, as summarized in Table 6 . Consider first temporal relationships running from current real interest payments (∆RIP t ) to future primary deficits (∆PDEF t+i ). Like equation (6) a negative relationship may either indicate that primary deficits compensate for changes in real interest payments to help limit debt accumulation (consistent with an MD regime) or that the price level (and hence real interest payments) anticipate future primary deficits (consistent with an FD regime and the FTPL). By contrast, a positive relationship indicates that primary deficits respond to real interest payments in an unstable fashion (consistent with an FD regime) or that current interest rates (and hence interest payments) respond positively to anticipated future primary deficits (reflecting higher risk). 29 The absence of a relationship suggests that the primary deficit is exogenous, consistent with an FD regime.
Consider next relationships in system (9) that run from the current primary deficit (∆PDEF t ) to future real interest payments (∆RIP t+i ). Under an MD regime current innovations to the primary deficit w PDEFt should be related to future government debt and hence interest payments. For example, when the government reduces the primary deficit, it pays down the debt and hence reduces future interest payments (either through the stock of liabilities, the interest rate, or both). But, a negative relationship between w PDEFt and future RIP is also consistent with an MD regime as it indicates that government responds to lower (higher) expected future interest payments by borrowing more (less) and hence running higher (lower) primary deficits today. By contrast, under an FD regime, w PDEFt would be uncorrelated with future RIP.
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In Table 7 , exclusion (Granger causality) tests and impulse response functions (IRF's) are summarized for system (9), estimated with 2 and 4 lags, for both the entire 1991:1 -2000:2 period and the selected subsamples.
31 Like the estimates of equation (8), there is little evidence for either the entire sample or the selected subsamples that current ∆RIP helps explain future ∆PDEF. Rather, the null hypothesis that current ∆RIP does not explain future ∆PDEF is never rejected. Moreover, all of the corresponding IRF's are insignificant. However, there is evidence that current ∆PDEF helps explain future ∆RIP. For the 4-lag model, for both the entire sample and the post-Real period (1994:7-2000:2), the null hypothesis that current ∆PDEF does not explain future ∆RIP, can be rejected at the 90 percent level or better, and the corresponding IRF's are significant. Note also that the IRF's indicate a negative relationship: positive (negative) current values of w PDEF imply future decreases (increases) in RIP.
Rolling samples are also applied separately to both equations in the VAR system (9). Rolling F-statistics for the exclusion of past ∆RIP on current ∆PDEF and past ∆PDEF on current ∆RIP are presented in Charts 5 and 6, respectively. These charts suggest that during certain periods, there were statistically significant relationships ∆RIP and ∆PDEF in both directions. Chart 5 confirms the results of the single equation analysis of the previous section: there was a significant negative relationship (and especially so for the two-lag model) between current ∆RIP on future ∆PDEF during the first years of the Real plan, from (approximately) the third quarter of 1994 through early 1996.
As suggested above, there are two ways to interpret this finding. On the one hand, according to a forward-looking interpretation, this finding might represent adjustments of the price level in anticipation of future primary deficits (consistent with the FTPL). However, since this is the low inflation period, and such a finding was not evident during the high inflation period, this interpretation is not plausible. It is somewhat more plausible to put a backward-looking interpretation on this finding: during the initial months of the Real plan, government debt was kept under control by reductions in the primary deficit.
Likewise, Chart 6 suggests a significant negative relationship between past ∆PDEF on current ∆RIP was also concentrated in the first months of the Real plan, but mainly during 1995. This finding may represent an implicit (rather than explicit) intertemporal decision by the government: with the implicit real interest rate on public debt falling between 1995 and 1997, the government was not as compelled as it might have otherwise been to either reduce the primary deficit or to quickly implement needed reforms.
V. ADJUSTMENT OF DISCRETIONARY EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES.
Evidence presented above suggests that, apart from the initial months of the Real plan, Brazil's fiscal regime more closely resembled FD than MD, in the sense that primary deficit appeared not to adjust to interest payments. A question closely related to the above analysis is whether adjustments of PDEF to RIP occur through changes in expenditures, revenues, or both.
32 As in many countries, Brazilian authorities are limited in their ability to make such adjustments. On the expenditure side, wages, certain social entitlements such as pension benefits, and constitutional transfers to the sub-national governments are legally predetermined. For this reason, discretionary elements of the budget include basically other current and capital expenditure. On the tax side, room for discretion lies mainly in federal taxes (set by the central authority) rather than state or local taxes. Thus, to analyze how the discretionary elements of the federal budget adjust, consider the following expression for the real operational deficit: In Table 9 , exclusion (Granger causality) tests and impulse response functions (IRF's) are summarized for modified system (11), estimated with 2 and 4 lags, for both the entire 1991:1 -2000:2 period and the selected subsamples. 34 Evidence indicates that past ∆RIP helps explain some current elements of ∆PDEF, for both the entire sample and the selected subsamples. However, this evidence is not strong and results are sensitive to the number of lags included. For example, ∆RIP helps explain ∆PDO in the two-lag but not the four-lag 33 There are, of course, also interrelationships among the elements of the primary deficit, PDO, T 34 As before, several other lag lengths were estimated, but qualitative results were similar to those presented here.
model, and the significant relationship is concentrated primarily in the post-Tequila period. By contrast, ∆RIP helps explain ∆G in the four-lag but not the two-lag model.
Relationships between lagged elements of ∆PDEF and current ∆RIP are stronger. This is especially true for the 4-lag model: for the entire sample, null hypotheses that past ∆PDO, ∆G and ∆T do not explain current ∆RIP can each be rejected at the 90 percent level or better, and corresponding IRF's are significant. Note, however, that significant relationships are concentrated mainly in the immediate post-Real period. For the pre-Real period, the null hypotheses are never rejected, while for the post-Real period, they are always rejected at the 90 percent level or better. For the post -Tequila period, in no case can the null hypotheses that lagged ∆PDO, ∆G or ∆T do not explain current ∆RIP be rejected, while for the post-Real period, these hypotheses are always rejected at the 90 percent level or better.
Was there a change in patterns of fiscal responses after the Real plan? In the post-Real period, federal taxes T F and discretionary expenditures G D appear to cause real interest payments RIP. As before, F-statistics for rolling samples applied to each equation separately, plotted in Charts 7 to 12 help reveal exactly when statistically significant relationships between ∆RIP and elements of ∆PDEF took place. These results, in large part consistent with those presented previously. However, Chart 11 shows an important exception: statistically significant relationships from lagged ∆G D to current ∆RIP occur only if the devaluation of early 1999 is included. An outlier analysis further indicates that this significant relationship depends entirely on one extremely high value for ∆G D in early 1997.
According to IRF's shown in Charts 13 and 14, in the post-Real plan period, current innovations to ∆T F and to a lesser degree in ∆PDO have statistically significant effects on future ∆RIP (these estimates use the four-lag model, but other lag lengths yielded similar results). In the case of federal taxes T F , the overall response is negative; a positive and significant response occurs at lag 5, while a more-than-offsetting negative response occurs at lag 6. This result suggests that, during this period, tax increases helped limit indebtedness. 35 However, in the opposite direction, innovations to other elements of the primary deficit PDO appear to be negatively related to real interest payments: a positive and significant response occurs at lag 9, while a more-than-offsetting negative response occurs at lag 10. Thus, in anticipation of lower interest payments, the government increased the portion of the primary deficit that contains wages and entitlements.
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper examines several questions related to intertemporal solvency and fiscal adjustment in Brazil between 1991-2000, using monthly fiscal data. First, has recent fiscal policy in Brazil been sustainable? In light of dramatic policy shifts, has fiscal policy been sustainable at some times but not at others? Results for both the entire period from January 1991 to February 2000 and several subperiods indicate that the deficit is stationary and hence fiscal policy is sustainable. Somewhat differently, estimates from rolling two-year samples suggest that, between (approximately) late 1995 and early 1999 (when Real depreciated), the null hypothesis of non-stationarity was not rejected, indicating that the fiscal deficit was growing boundlessly. Afterwards, the deficit appears again to be stationary.
Second, is the recent fiscal regime in Brazil better characterized as 'fiscal dominant' or 'monetary dominant'? Does the primary deficit adjust to real interest payments, and if so, how? To limit debt accumulation, does the authority adjust the primary deficit in response to interest payments? In this aspect, the results were weak. While both backward-and forwardlooking tests reveal some relationship between these variables during certain periods (primarily the post-Real plan), there was little relationship for the 1991 -2000 period as a whole.
Backward looking tests indicated the primary deficit decreased in response to real interest payments, in a stabilizing fashion, immediately after the Real plan. However, during this same period, current innovations to the primary deficit were negatively associated with future real interest payments, reflecting a deterioration of the primary balance and lower implicit real interest rates on public debt between 1995 and 1997. Such a pattern might reflect a rational intertemporal choice by the government to borrow more today in anticipation of lower interest rates. More likely, this result reflected an implicit calculus by the government. In any event, such a strategy may also involve undue risks and should be pursued symmetrically.
Third, did the adjustments of the primary deficit occur in expenditures, revenues, or both? This analysis suggests that, after the real-Plan (but not before), current innovations in federal taxes are negatively related to future real interest payments, suggesting a break in fiscal regime. After the Real plan, debt was restrained with higher tax revenues. However, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between current innovations to discretionary expenditures and future interest payments. And, current innovations to other elements of the primary deficit are negatively related to future real interest payments, perhaps reflecting once again the implicit intertemporal choice mentioned above.
The results in this paper are relevant to recent developments in Brazil, regarding both fiscal adjustment and the recently announced inflation targeting regime. Substantial fiscal adjustment took place at the end of 1998, and especially during 1999 and 2000 (following the collapse of the Real). During this period, Brazil's fiscal policy was sustainable in the sense that its operational deficit appears to be stationary. But an MD regime as defined ---a statistically significant relationship between PDEF and RIP ---is found to be absent.
In June of 1999, the central bank announced the adoption of an inflation targeting regime as the main anchor for inflation expectations. It is well known that such a program requires that the monetary authority not be dominated by financing fiscal requirements. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that to empirically find that an MD regime is absent does not necessarily mean that the monetary authority will be unable to pursue an independent policy like inflation targeting. For example, the recent fiscal adjustments, until further consolidated, may represent transitory adjustments, not closely tied to debt accumulation, rather than the regular adjustment of PDEF to RIP implied by (7). However, an independent monetary policy requires credibility: markets must believe that future adjustments to the primary deficit, if required, will in fact occur. And, the qualitative nature of the adjustment has welfare implications: continual adjustments may be better for the economy than discrete ones, as they imply smaller, smoother changes in either expenditures or taxes, or both.
Finally, results in this paper are relevant to an implication of the recently developed fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) . If the market perceives a gap between current government debt and the present value of future primary surpluses in an FD regime, current innovations in RIP should be negatively related to future PDEF, reflecting a jump in the price level and hence a fall in the real value of government obligations today. Such a relationship would have been most likely during the pre-Real period, when high inflation was required to balance the budget. The absence of such a relationship favors more traditional monetary theories of inflation over the FTPL. Money, Credit, and Banking; v23 n2 May 1991 , pp. 206-23. Woodford, Michael (1995 Table 1 . Note: To calculate annual flows as a percent of GDP, real monthly flows from January to December are summed; this sum is then multiplied by the December price level and then divided by the above GDP figure based on December prices. This procedure may yield annual flows in percent of GDP different from other published figures. Government pays down past debt, consistent with MD regime; or price level anticipates future primary deficits, consistent with FD regime and FTPL (applies only to RIP). Chart 9 F-statistics for causality tests of ∆RIP t on ∆T 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8
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